It was pointed out to me in a tweet that there were in fact TWO emails posted in the BritAm leak. One on “Iranian issue”. A quick inspect reveals fraud.
Within the Iranian issue email the header contains the following:
with ESMTP id nWRHL2NRVdAP for ;;
Thu, 16 Oct 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)
Received: from smtp.clients.netdns.net (smtp.clients.netdns.net [202.157.148.149])
by titanium.netdns.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27D5F523A0E
for ;; Thu, 16 Oct 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)
And within the Syrian email, the header contained the following:
with ESMTP id nWRHL2NRVdAP for ;;
Mon, 24 Dec 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)
Received: from smtp.clients.netdns.net (smtp.clients.netdns.net [202.157.148.149])
by titanium.netdns.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27D5F523A0E
for ;; Mon, 24 Dec 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)
The date is different, as one would expect but the TIME is exactly the same. This means that one or both of these emails has been edited from the email database. The forgery is clear, it’s time to burn this Trojan horse. Whoever made this leak purposely left this sign of fraud behind, in order to later point it out and use it as a platform to attack ALL leaks unfavourable to the US and to try and claim that a chemical weapon attack cannot possibly be a false flag.
Nice try.
UPDATE 1: Note that in both emails the date is modified throughout, but the time is left intact. Such attention to detail implies its not just a fraud, but a deliberate fraud. This turns the magic on the magician: why create this two level false flag when there is no intention to carry out a chemical weapon false flag? This highly sophisticated cyber warfare operation should indicate the stakes at play: what is the prize behind the sacrifice of a mercenary organisation like BritAm?
[…] UPDATE: BritAm leak fraud confirmed. […]
Hi, The email server in question is Postfix, i.e. a Linux email server which performed the ESMTP relays in this instance, is it possible that the Postfix server is set up to process relays on a schedule with a Linux Cron job (task scheduler) ? So even though they’re different emails on different dates – the sender just happened to send both of them at roughly the same time of day (which would fit the military profile of the sender) – I’m just asking a question here, as I believe this header information does not necessarily mean one of the messages was forged. Also there was an article written about this by Wayne Madsen, who studied the documents in question, and he worked for both US Naval Intelligence and the NSA for many years, I’m sure he would have studied these headers carefully and spotted any anomalies before putting pen to paper.
It’s quite possible that is the case, but usually these kind of correspondences are transferred within seconds. The other objections stand nevertheless, unless the hacker can provide us with a more complete archive of messages, we should base anything on the two emails that can easily be manipulated.
The rest of the data seems to be the bait, at least to me, as it is genuine and comprehensive.
Hi SyrianCommando, Yes I have taken a closer look at both email headers and it does seem highly improbable that one of the emails is not forged, and yes there should be a much fuller archive than this containing more emails. Smoke & mirrors indeed. Lets see how this develops. Thank You
What do you guys think now?
[…] UPDATE: BritAm leak fraud confirmed | The Syrian Commandohttp://syriancommando.wordpress.com/2013/01/29/update-britam-leak-fraud-confirmed/It was pointed out to me in a tweet that there were in fact TWO emails posted in the BritAm leak. One on “Iranian issue”. A quick inspect reveals fraud. Within the Iranian issue email the header co… […]