Archive for January, 2013

It was pointed out to me in a tweet that there were in fact TWO emails posted in the BritAm leak. One on “Iranian issue”. A quick inspect reveals fraud.

Within the Iranian issue email the header contains the following:

with ESMTP id nWRHL2NRVdAP for ;;
Thu, 16 Oct 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)
Received: from smtp.clients.netdns.net (smtp.clients.netdns.net [])
by titanium.netdns.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27D5F523A0E
for ;; Thu, 16 Oct 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)

And within the Syrian email, the header contained the following:

with ESMTP id nWRHL2NRVdAP for ;;
Mon, 24 Dec 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)
Received: from smtp.clients.netdns.net (smtp.clients.netdns.net [])
by titanium.netdns.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27D5F523A0E
for ;; Mon, 24 Dec 2012 23:57:18 +0800 (SGT)

The date is different, as one would expect but the TIME is exactly the same. This means that one or both of these emails has been edited from the email database. The forgery is clear, it’s time to burn this Trojan horse. Whoever made this leak purposely left this sign of fraud behind, in order to later point it out and use it as a platform to attack ALL leaks unfavourable to the US and to try and claim that a chemical weapon attack cannot possibly be a false flag.

Nice try.

UPDATE 1: Note that in both emails the date is modified throughout, but the time is left intact. Such attention to detail implies its not just a fraud, but a deliberate fraud. This turns the magic on the magician: why create this two level false flag when there is no intention to carry out a chemical weapon false flag? This highly sophisticated cyber warfare operation should indicate the stakes at play: what is the prize behind the sacrifice of a mercenary organisation like BritAm?

Read Full Post »

A few days ago a suspicious email and archive popped up by a hacker going by the handle “JAsIrX”. On twitter I relayed the alarming contents immediately as the archive of confidential looked comprehensive and accurate. I write this to tell you, I may have made a terrible error, as did the Trojans so long ago when presented with temptation…

The email itself had a valid header and experts analysed it, showing that it proved internal exchange within BritAm’s network.

A large amount of detailed documents, fill with private details and other information.

A large amount of detailed documents, fill with private details and other information.

For those unaware, here is the content of the email included in the archive:

“Phil We’ve got a new offer. It’s about Syria again. Qataris propose an attractive deal and swear that the idea is approved by Washington. We’ll have to deliver a CW to Homs, a Soviet origin g-shell from Libya similar to those that Assad should have. They want us to deploy our Ukrainian personnel that should speak Russian and make a video record. Frankly, I don’t think it’s a good idea but the sums proposed are enormous. Your opinion? Kind regards David”

When you put it all together, it seems like a closed case. A strong conspiracy is revealed with a British private military company (PMC) being contracted out by Qatar to create a chemical weapon (CW) false flag, around December when Obama was busy harping on about the very topic…

BritAm PMC Logo ... Nothing more than mercenaries with a fancy name.

BritAm PMC Logo … Nothing more than mercenaries with a fancy name.

At least, on the surface! The hack definitely happened as BritAm’s website went down. Files were definitely leaked, no company would purposely leak out its employee’s passports and other personal information. But let us ask some important questions:

a) Why did only one email get leaked?

Of the entire 200 megabyte archive, only one email is leaked out, directed to the company’s manager. Usually with large leaks, a more complete archive of emails is leaked from the target’s database. Why did the hacker choose only to leak this particular email? How they he sift it out of the rest? Which leads to the second question.

b) Why BritAm?

The hacker claimed that they found the data on a Malaysian based server that had faulty intrusion detection software. Isn’t it odd that they would be looking around there in the first place and be motivated to target this company. Could it be chance? Of course. But more likely it was a well researched “leak”, much like the Stratfor attack that was conducted by the FBI (since AnonymouSabu was working as an agent of theirs at the time he helped hack it) timed in response to its realistic articles about Syria… and this again leads to the penultimate, but very important question.

c) Why now?

If you can entertain for a minute that this hack was indeed well-planned and not accidental as the hacker claimed, you would ask then, why would they release it now? If it was unplanned, they would have no reason to delay its release. In fact, there is a very good reason:

Syrian Electronic Army Leaks website

Syrian Electronic Army Leaks website

The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) has recently released a large amount of emails directly from Qatar’s email servers. Earlier the SEA hacked into the Saudi defense ministry’s servers and was able to completely transfer the database and access the content management system. The leaks so far are damning and have been confirmed by the Al Akhbar Lebanese newspaper as being “genuine”. The media, has mostly ignored this massive leak, including alternate media, who would normally be swarming around any mention of a “leak”… Instead, some very odd things have been happening.

Suddenly, a few days after the announcement and release of the hack, Anonymous has decided to launch a “warhead” campaign, complete with a slick media campaign and loud promises… a clear attempt to OVERSHADOW the massive and real SEA leaks. This “chemical weapon” loud horn is sounded by the leak, gathering much more attention than minutes between gulf leaders (puppet Arabs of America). Putting these together, we can ask one final and simple question.

d) What is the purpose of this leak?

Why the leak, with a single email? Why now? Why only one email? It’s clear. A single email is very easy to dismiss as fake. In fact, during the Stratfor hack, anonymouSabu’s henchmen planted an email by CEO George Friedman claiming he had resigned, when in fact he had done no such thing. When you control a server you are able to fabricate any kind of email you want to “leak”. Only a long conversation with realistic time stamps follow ups and reference emails to check for the writer’s style, can possibly be used to confirm the authenticity of an email.

And BritAm has been silent!

Which means that this leak can be quickly dismissed as nothing more than a fabrication. The hack will of course be acknowledged as in the case of Stratfor. Who will you believe, BritAm or the hacker?

That’s the problem. Soon, by undermining the validity of the leak in the minds of the media consumers, it will by extension, undermine the validity of the SEA leaks even though the latter is comprehensive and includes signed, scanned documents and a huge amount of cross references. That won’t matter, a single “fake” can spoil all the real leaks.

But not this time! By anticipating this strategy and demanding a complete archive from “JAsIrX” before discussing the leak any further, we can burn this possible Trojan horse before it enters our gates.

Read Full Post »